UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

9-19-2011

Woodley v. State Appellant's Brief Dckt. 38195

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"Woodley v. State Appellant's Brief Dckt. 38195" (2011). Not Reported. 78.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/78

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

ALEXANDER JASOJ\i WOODLEY,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

S. Ct. No. 38195-2010

OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh
Judicial District of the State ofldaho
In and For the County of Bingham

HONORABLE DARREN B. SIMPSON
Presiding Judge

Robyn Fyffe
NEVIN, BENJA!½IN, McKAY
& BARTLETT
303 West Baimock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 343-1000

Lawrence Wasden
IDAHO ATTORNEY GENERAL
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
(208) 334-2400

Attorneys for Appellant

Attorneys for Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Table Of Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
II. Statement Of The Case ....................................................... 1
A. Nature of the Case .................................................... 1
B. General Course of Proceedings .......................................... 1
1. Underlying criminal proceedings ................................... 1
2. Post-Conviction proceedings ...................................... 2
III. Issue Presented On Appeal ................................................... 4
Did the district court err in declining to equitably toll the statute of limitations on Mr.
Woodley's claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the district court's
error in sentencing and allowing the first appeal to be dismissed?
IV. Argument ................................................................ 4
A. The District Comi Erred in Dismissing Mr. Woodley's Claims as Untimely Because
He Presented an Issue of Fact as to Whether His Mental State Prevented Him from
Timely Filing a Post-Conviction Petition Standard of Review ..................... 6
B. The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Woodley's Claims as
Untimely Because Counsel Had an Obligation to Advise Him That the Issues Raised in
His Pro Se Motions Would Be Properly Raised in a Post-Conviction Petition and the
State's Conduct Was Misleading ........................................... 8
C. The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Woodley's Claims as
Untimely Because the Pro Se Motions Tolled the Time to File a Motion for PostConviction Relief ....................................................... 11
V. Conclusion

.............................................................. 13

I. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES

Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, (2010) ......................................................................................... 11
United States v. Johnson, 988 F .2d 941, (I 993) .................................................................... 11, 13
STATE CASES

Amboh v. State, 149 Idaho 650, (2010) .............................................................................. 4, 7, 8, 9
Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, (2004) ................................................................................. 7
Chico-Rodriguez v. State, 141 Idaho 579, (2005) .......................................................................... 6
Freeman v. State, 122 Idaho 627, (1992) ....................................................................................... 5
Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, (2002) ...................................................................................... 5
Hayes v. State, 146 Idaho 353, (2008) ........................................................................................... 5
Leer v. State, 148 Idaho 112, (2009) ...................................................................................... 5, 6, 8
Person v. State, 147 Idaho 453, (2009) .......................................................................................... 5
Sayas v. State, 139 Idaho 957, (2003) ............................................................................................ 6
Schultz v. State, 151 Idaho 383, (201 I) .............................................................................. 4, 5, 8, 9
Sparks v. State, 140 Idaho 292, (2004) ...................................................................................... 4, 5
State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, (2003) ........................................................................... IO, 12, 13
State v. Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374, (1993) ...................................................................................... 10
State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, (2005) .......................................................................................... 12
DOCKETED CASES

State v. Alexander Jason Woodley, Dock. No. 38348 .......................................................... passim

11

IDAHO STATUTES
I.C. § 19-4902 ................................................................................................................................ 5

111

II. STATEIVIENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

This is an appeal from the district court's judgment granting in part Mr. Alexander Jason
Woodley's petition for post-conviction relief.
B.

General Course of Proceedings
1.

Underlying criminal proceedings

Mr. Woodley pled guilty to felony driving under the influence pursuant to a binding plea
agreement, which provided that the district court withhold judgment and that Mr. Woodley not
serve additional jail time. R. (38348) 60-67. 1 The agreement gave Mr. Woodley the right to
withdraw his guilty plea in the event the district court rejected the sentencing recommendations
set forth in the agreement. Id. at 61. Although the district cou1i indicated that it was accepting
the plea agreement, it nonetheless suspended a unified term of seven years and placed Mr.
Woodley on probation for five years instead of granting a withheld judgment. See id. at 69-70,
303. Mr. Woodley, through counsel, filed a timely notice of appeal ("the first appeal") and
motion to appoint the State Appellate Public Defender ("SAPD"). Id. at 81-86. The Supreme
Court conditionally dismissed the appeal "unless the required fees for preparation of the Clerk's
Record and Reporter's Transcript [were] paid to the District Court within" twenty-one days. Id.
at 87. Counsel failed to pay the record and transcript fees or to support Mr. Woodley's motion to
appoint the SAPD with a financial affidavit. See Tr. (38195) p. 51, In. 3 - 54, In. 15 (state's
recitation of procedural history relating to dismissal of appeal). Tbe Supreme Court therefore

1

Contemporaneous with this brief, Mr. Woodely has filed a request that the Court take
judicial notice of the record and transcripts in an appeal in the criminal case, Stare v. Alexander
Jason Woodley, Dock. No. 38348. Citations herein will refer to the respective docket numbers.

dismissed the appeal on October 22, 2007 and issued a rcmittitur on November 14, 2007. R.
(3 8348) 102, 120.

On January 31, 2008, the district court revoked Mr. Woodley' s probation and retained
jurisdiction for 180 days. R. (38348) 132-33. On April 11, 2008, Mr. Woodley, acting prose,
filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and a motion to refile the first appeal or to file that
appeal late ("pro se motions"). Id. at 151-156. [n these motions, Mr. Woodley noted the district
court failed to follow the plea agreement and asserted that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel. Id. On September 4, 2008, the district comt relinquished jurisdiction and imposed Mr.
Woodley's original sentence. Id. at 323-327. Mr. Woodley appealed the district court's decision
to revoke probation and impose his sentence and the Court of Appeals affirmed in an
unpublished opinion. See id. at 352-54. The district court also denied Mr. Woodley's prose
motions, noting in part that it lacked jurisdiction to consider either motion. Id. at 301-315. No
appeal was filed from the district court's denial of the motion to withdraw Mr. Woodley's guilty
plea.
2.

Post-conviction proceedings

On March 25, 2009, Mr. Woodley filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the district court's error in not withholding
judgment, failing to support the motion to appoint the SAPD in the first appeal with evidence of
indigence and failing to file a post-conviction petition or to amend his prose motions to a postconviction petition. R. (38195) 7-10. Mr. Woodley filed a motion for equitable tolling arguing
that the statute of limitations should be tolled because mental illness and medication prevented
him from timely pursuing post-conviction relief Id. at 36-37, 63-64. Mr. Woodley also argued
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that his prose motions should be construed as initiating post-conviction proceedings. Id. at 65.
The district comi denied ~1r. Woodley's motion for equitable tolling, finding that
regardless of Mr. Woodley's "mental state during the period of time he had to file a timely
petition for post-conviction relief as to [the] original judgment, [he] was represented by able
counsel who were charged with representing [his] legal interests." Id. at 110. Mr. Woodley
responded that the district court's refusal to toll the statute of limitations based on Mr. Woodley's
status as being represented established that Mr. Woodley's counsel was ineffective for not timely
filing a post-conviction relief petition or asking the district court to construe his prose motions
as initiating a post-conviction action. Id. at 132-36.
In an amended petition, Mr. Woodley asserted that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel because counsel did not notify the district court that it failed to follow the binding plea
agreement and permitted the first appeal to be dismissed. Id. at 184-86. Mr. Woodley also
contended that the attorney appointed to represent him after the first appeal was dismissed was
ineffective for failing to timely initiate a post-conviction action. Id. at 186-87. Finally, Mr.
Woodley alleged that counsel was ineffective for failing to appeal the denial of Mr. Woodley's
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Id. at 187. The state moved for summary dismissal of Mr.
Woodley' s petition as untimely but conceded that his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
for failure to appeal the denial of Mr. Woodley's motion to withdraw his plea was timely. R.
(38195) 193-94, 200; Tr. (38195) p. 91, In. -18.
The district court concluded that "without question" it erred in sentencing '\Irr. Woodley
"and suspending that sentence, rather than entering a withheld judgment and placing [Mr.]
Woodley on probation, without allowing [Mr.] Woodley to withdraw his plea." R. (38195) 207.
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The district court also found that counsel's failure to either ensure the SAPD's appointment or
pay the required transcript and record fees caused the

appeal's dismissal. Id. The district

court nevertheless dismissed Mr. Woodley's claims regarding counsel's failure to object to the
plea agreement's breach and his failure to prevent the first appeal from being dismissed as
untimely. Id. at 208.
The district court granted Mr. Woodley an evidentiary hearing on his claim that counsel
was ineffective for failing to appeal the denial of his motion to withdraw his plea. Id. at 209.
Following the evidentiary hearing, the district court concluded that Mr. Woodley was entitled to
appeal the order denying his motion to withdraw his plea and re-issued that order allowing Mr.
Woodley to file a timely appeal. Id. at 229-250. Mr. Woodley's appeal from the reissued order
is pending in Docket No. 38348.

III. ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Did the district court err in declining to equitably toll the statute of limitations on Mr.
Woodley's claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the district court's error in
sentencing and allowing the first appeal to be dismissed?

IV. ARGUMENT
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding which is civil in nature. Schultz
v. State, 151 Idaho 383,385,256 P.3d 791, 793 (Ct. App. 2011); Sparks v. State, 140 Idaho 292,

295, 92 P.3d 542, 545 (Ct. App. 2004). Summary dismissal of a post-conviction action, either
upon motion of the court or the state, is permissible only when the petitioner's evidence has raised
no genuine issue of material fact that, ifresolved in the petitioner's favor, would entitle him to the
requested relief. Amboh v. State, 149 Idaho 650,651,239 P.3d 448,449 (Ct. App. 2010);
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Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 272, 61 P. 3d 626, 629 (Ct. App. 2002). If such a factual issue
is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Amboh, 149 Idaho at 651, 239 P.3d at
449; c)parks, 140 Idaho at 295, 92 P.3d at 545. On appeal from the summary dismissal of a
petition for post-conviction relief, this Court inquires whether the petition, affidavits, or other
evidence supporting the petition allege facts which, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief.

Hayes v. State, 146 Idaho 353,355, 195 P.3d 712, 714 (Ct. App. 2008).
A petition for post-conviction relief may be filed at any time within one year from the
expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of appeal or from the determination of
a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later. LC. § 19-4902(a). The statute of limitation
may be equitably tolled to protect a petitioner's due process right to have a meaningful
opportunity to present his or her claims. Schultz, 151 Idaho at 385-86, 256 P .3d at 793-94; Leer v.

State, 148 Idaho 112,115,218 P.3d 1173, 1176 (Ct. App. 2009). This Comi freely reviews the
district court's construction and application of the limitation statute. Person v. State, 147 Idaho
453,454, 210 P.3d 561, 562 (Ct. App. 2009); Freeman v. State, 1

Idaho 627, 628, 836 P.2d

l 088, 1089 (Ct. App. 1992).
Here, the district court erred in dismissing Mr. Woodley's claims as untimely without
addressing Mr. Woodley' s claim that the limitation period should be tolled as a result of mental
illness and psychotropic medication. Mr. Woodley was harmed by this error because he presented
an issue of fact as to whether his mental state prevented him from timely filing a post-conviction
petition. The district court further erred in refusing to recognize that counsel's ineftective
assistance, in combination with the misleading statements made by the state, could toll the statute
oflimitations. Moreover, the district court should have construed Mr. Woodley's prose motions
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as initiating a post-conviction action. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the district court's
dismissal of his claims as untimely and remand the case for further proceedings.
A.

The District Court Erred in Dismissing Mr. Woodley's Claims as Untimely Because
He Presented an Issue of Fact as to Whether His Mental State Prevented Him from
Timely Filing a Post-Conviction Petition

A mental disease and/or psychotropic medication, which renders a petitioner incompetent
and prevents him or her from timely pursuing challenges to his conviction, equitably tolls the
statute of limitations for post-conviction proceedings. Sayas v. State, 139 Idaho 957,960, 88
P.3d 776, 779 (Ct. App. 2003). To toll the statute of limitations on account of mental illness or
medication, a petitioner must show that he suffered from a serious mental illness which rendered
him incompetent to understand his legal right to bring an action within a year or otherwise
rendered him incapable of taking necessary steps to pursue that right. Chico-Rodriguez v. State,
141 Idaho 579,582, 114 P.3d 137, 140 (Ct. App. 2005).
Rather than analyze whether Mr. Woodley's mental illness or psychotropic medication
prevented him from timely filing a post-conviction petition, the district court found that Mr.
Woodley "was represented by able counsel who were charged with representing [his] legal
interests" during the relevant time frame. 2 R. (38195) 110. However, counsel was appointed to
represent Mr. Woodley in the criminal action. R. (38348) 111, 226. In order to secure

2

In its order denying Mr. Woodley's motion for equitable tolling, the district court
incorrectly indicated that Mr. Woodley had I 00 days from the date his appeal was dismissed on
October 27, 2007 to file a petition for post-conviction relief. R. (38 I 95) I 09. The district court
recognized its mistake and later indicated that Mr. Woodley had one year from October 27, 2007
to seek post-conviction relief. Tr. (38195) p. 46, ln. 6-9, ln.17-19. The statute of limitations
actually expired one year after the issuance of the remittitur on November 21, 2007. See Leer,
148 Idaho at 114, 218 P .3d at 1175 (noting the petitioner had one year from date remittitur was
issued in criminal appeal to file his petition for post-conviction relief).
6

appointment of counsel in a post-conviction case, the petitioner - prose - must first file a petition
that alleges facts raising the possibility of a valid claim. See Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789,
793, 102 P.3d 1108, 1112 (2004). That counsel was appointed to assist Mr. Woodley in the
criminal action did not foreclose the possibility that mental illness and the effects of medication
prevented Mr. Woodley from filing a post-conviction petition prose.
Therefore, the district court erred in denying Mr. Woodley's motion for equitable tolling
on the basis that counsel was appointed to represent him in the underlying criminal proceedings
during the relevant time period. The district court should have instead addressed Mr. Woodley's
claim that his mental illness and medications prevented him from timely filing the post-conviction
action.
Moreover, Mr. Woodley presented an issue of fact as to whether mental illness and
psychotropic medication prevented him from timely filing a post-conviction action. The remittitur
from Mr. Woodley's direct appeal was filed November 21, 2007 and he was required to file his
petition for post-conviction relief before November 21, 2008. 3 On November 9, 2007, Mr.
Woodley was admitted to the Eastern Idaho Regional Behavioral Health Center as a result of
suicidal ideation and self-mutilation. R. (38195) 36; State's Exhibit A (38348). Upon his release,
he was prescribed psychotropic medicine. R. (38195) 36. On January 29, 2008, the district court
sentenced Mr. Woodley to a period ofretained jurisdiction and the Idaho Department of

3

Mr. Woodley had one year from the date the Supreme Court issued the remittitur in his
first appeal notwithstanding the fact that the appeal was dismissed. An appeal, which is
dismissed as untimely, does not toll the post-conviction statute oflimitations. Amboh, 149 Idaho
at 652, 39 P.3d at 450. In a situation involving an untimely appeal, the appellate court has no
jurisdiction to hear the appeal and permitting an untimely appeal to restart the limitation period
would render it meaningless. Id. Conversely, Mr. Woodley's first appeal was timely filed and
this Court possessed jurisdiction to determine the appeal on its merits.
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Con-ection assigned him to the mental health unit where he continued to take psychotropic
medication. See R. (38195) 68. On April 23, 2008, Mr. Woodley suffered a breakdown and was
hospitalized at the Idaho Maximum Security Institute. Id. at 3 6, 41, 43. On May 11, 2008, prison
staff recommended a second rider because Mr. Woodely exhibited cognitive distortions and
difficulty grasping and applying concepts. Id. at 41-4 3.
The district cou11 erred in denying Mr. Woodley's motion for equitable tolling on the basis
that counsel was appointed to represent him in the underlying criminal proceedings during the
relevant time period. Additionally, Mr. Woodely presented an issue of fact as to whether mental
illness and psychotropic medication prevented him from timely filing a post-conviction action.
This Comi should therefore reverse the district com1's order denying equitable tolling and remand
the case for further proceedings.

B.

The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Woodley's Claims as
Untimely Because Counsel Had an Obligation to Advise Him That the Issues Raised
in His Pro Sc Motions Would Be Properly Raised in a Post-Conviction Petition and
the State's Conduct Was Misleading
Regardless of whether the district court erred in rejecting Mr. Woodley's equitable tolling

claim because counsel was appointed in the criminal action, this Court should conclude that the
district court erred in failing to recognize that counsel's neglect and the state's conduct deprived
Mr. Woodley of a meaningful opportunity to present his claims.
Equitable tolling in post-conviction actions is borne of the petitioner's due process right to
have a meaningful opportunity to present his or her claims. Schultz, 151 Idaho at 385-86, 256
P.3d at 793-94; Leer, 148 Idaho at 115, 218 P.3d at 1176. ·'Tolling is not allowed for a
petitioner's own inaction." Schultz, 151 Idaho at 386, 256 P.3d at 794; see also Amboh, 149 Idaho
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at 653, 239 P.3d at 451. In Amboh, the petitioner claimed that his defense attorney was deficient
for failing to file a timely notice of appeal from his judgment of conviction. Ilowevcr, well within
the statute of limitations to file a petition for post-conviction relief, counsel informed the
petitioner that his appeal was untimely and informed him that he had "post-conviction rights."
The Court concluded:
Even though the defense attorney may have contributed confusion by pointlessly
filing an untimely notice of appeal, if Amboh had exercised reasonable diligence
he could have determined that the appeal was dismissed long before the limitation
period for a post-conviction action expired. Instead, despite having been notified
that his appeal was filed after the appeal deadline, Amboh waited for nearly one
and a half years before he made any inquiry about the disposition of the appeal and
thereby learned of its dismissal. Neither the State nor anyone else concealed from
Amboh the fact that this appeal was untimely or that it had been dismissed.
Amboh's failure to file a timely petition raising his claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel was not due to an extraordinary circumstance beyond his control, but by
his own lack of diligence. In this circumstance, equitable tolling is not appropriate.
Amboh, 149 Idaho at 653,239 P.3d at 451. Similarly, in Schultz, the Court of Appeals concluded

that there was no deprivation of due process because the petitioner had a year and forty-two days
within which to file his post-conviction petition but chose to wait over three years because he
incorrectly believed the law allowed him to wait. Schultz, 151 Idaho at 387,256 P.3d at 795.
In contrast, Mr. Woodley was quite diligent about pursuing his rights but utilized the
incorrect vehicle to do so. Well within the statute of limitations, on April 11, 2008, Mr. Woodley
filed a motion to withdraw his plea alleging that the plea agreement was breached and that his
attorney was ineffective. R. (38348) 151-53. In his motion to re-file the first appeal or to file it
late, Mr. Woodley outlined counsel's ineffective assistance in permitting the appeal to be
dismissed. Id. at 154-55. Mr. Woodley drafted these motions pro sc although he was represented
by counsel at the time in the criminal case. Id. at 111. Thus, Mr. Woodley timely and diligently
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pursued his ineffective assistance of counsel claims but incorrectly titled his pleadings.
Moreover, by assisting Mr. Woodley with his pro se motions, counsel reinforced Mr.
Woodley's mistaken belief that he was correctly pursuing his relief. The law clearly provided that
the district court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the pro se motions and that ineffective
assistance of counsel was appropriately sought in post-conviction proceedings. State v. Jakoski,
139 Idaho 352,355, 79 P.3d 711, 714 (2003) (the trial court's jurisdiction to hear motion to
withdraw plea expires once the judgment becomes final); State v. A;fitchell, 124 Idaho 374,
76, 859 P.2d 972, 973-74 (Ct. App. 1993), (ineffective assistance of counsel claims appropriately
presented through post-conviction relief proceedings). Given these circumstances, counsel should
have advised Mr. Woodley of his post-conviction reliefrights and counsel's failure to do so
deprived Mr. Woodley of a meaningful opportunity to present his claims.
Aggravating the situation, in its objection to Mr. Woodley's motion to withdraw his plea,
the state argued:
The claims raised by [Mr. Woodley] should have been filed within a petition for
post-conviction relief pursuant to Title 19, Chapter 49, Idaho Code. Petitioner is
now beyond the statute of limitations for bringing such claims and is attempting to
use Idaho Criminal Rule 33 to avoid such claims being barred by the statue of
limitations applicable to post-conviction matters.
R. (38348) 23 L
This argument was misleading because Mr. Woodley filed his motion to withdraw his plea
well within the post-conviction statute of limitations and thus could not have filed that motion
simply to avoid the statute of limitations. Rather, it appears Mr. Woodley was simply mistaken
about the co1Tect manner in which to pursue his desired relief. Moreover, at the time the state's
brief was filed on August 8, 2008, the statute of limitations still would not expire for another three
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months. Thus, while the state's brief informed Mr. Woodley that his relief would be more
appropriately sought in a post-conviction action, it misled him into believing that he had already
lost the opportunity to do so. See also Tr. (38195) p. 98, ln. 1 14; R. 142.
Mr. Woodley diligently attempted to raise his ineffective assistance of counsel claims
within the statute of limitations but incorrectly did so by filing his pro se motions instead of a
document titled petition for post-conviction relief. Because counsel actively assisted Mr.
Woodley in pursuing his claims through the incorrect vehicle, counsel had an obligation to advise
Mr. Woodley of his post-conviction rights. Further, the state misled Mr. Woodley by
misinforming him regarding the true statute of limitations. These circumstances deprived Mr.
Woodley of a meaningful opportunity to pursue his post-conviction claims despite his diligent
attempts to do so. The district court therefore erred in refusing to apply equitable tolling and the
case should be remanded for further proceedings on the dismissed claims.
C.

The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Woodley's Claims as
Untimely Because the Pro Se Motions Tolled the Time to File a Motion for PostConviction Relief
As discussed above, Mr. Woodley alleged that he received ineffective assistance of

counsel in his pro sc motion to withdraw his plea and his motion to re-file the first appeal. R.
(38348) 151-55. Courts are obliged to liberally construe prose pleadings and to afford the inmate
litigant the benefit of any doubt Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010).
In light of the liberal construction given to the pleadings of pro se inmates, the unfortunate
mislabelling of a motion is not necessarily fatal to maintaining the inmate's claims. United States
v.

Johnson, 988 F.2d 94 l, 943 (9th Cir. 1993). In order to protect Mr. Woodley's due process

right to a meaningful opportunity to present his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the

l1

district court should have construed Mr. Woodley's mis-titled motion as a petition for postconviction relief or concluded that filing those motions tolled the time to file a post-conviction
petition.
Mr. Woodley recognizes that the Idaho Supreme Court declined to construe a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea as a petition for post-conviction relief in Jakoski. Nevertheless, an
appellate decision should be overruled if it is manifestly wrong or overruling is necessary to
vindicate plain, obvious principles oflaw and remedy continued injustice. State v. Watts, 142
Idaho 230,232, 127 P.3d 133, 135 (2005). The Jakoski Court recognized that "substance, not
form should govern" when a litigant mislabels a pleading. Jakoski, 139 Idaho at 355, 79 P.3d at
714. The Court nevertheless held that "it would be too much of a stretch to hold that a motion
filed in a criminal case can be considered as a pleading commencing civil litigation." Id. This
holding is fundamentally unfair and causes the deprivation of a meaningful opportunity for postconviction litigants to present their claims. Jakoski should therefore be overruled.
A pro se inmate - not only untrained in the law but also often lacking in education and

resources - does not understand the distinction between a motion filed in a case to attack a
conviction and a petition initiating a collateral proceeding to attack that conviction. Thus,
pleadings titled "petition for post-conviction relief' frequently list the criminal case number in the
caption. Indeed, Mr. Woodley's post-conviction petition erroneously listed the criminal case
number in the caption and the district court simply crossed it out and assigned a new civil case
number. R. (38195) 7. There is no reason that the district court could not similarly strike the
criminal case number in a pleading titled as a motion filed in the criminal case but clearly seeking
relief appropriate in a post-conviction action.
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The distinction relied on by the Jakoski Court
petition initiating a new action

a motion in the criminal action and a

is arbitrary, meaningless to a prose inmate and advocates fonn

over substance. Prose inmate pleadings should be liberally construed and treated as initiating the
action appropriate for the relief that is sought notwithstanding any unfortunate mislabeling of the
pleadings. See Johnson, 988 F.2d at 943. The rule in Jakoski is therefore fundamentally unfair
and deprives prose inmates of a meaningful opportunity to present their post-conviction claims.
Mr. Woodley timely raised his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in pleadings that
were mislabeled as "motions" instead of as a "petition" for post-conviction relief. These motions
should be liberally construed as initiating a post-conviction action or as tolling the time to initiate
such an action. The failure to do so would deprive Mr. Woodley of a meaningful opportunity to
present his claims and would therefore violate the procedural due process guarantee of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

V. CONCLUSION
Mr. Woodley respectfully asks this Court to reverse the district court's order summarily
dismissing his claims as untimely and to remand this case for further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted this_.__ day of September, 2011.
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

day of September, 201 I, I caused two true and

correct copies of the foregoing to be mailed to: Office of the Attorney General, P.O. Box 83720,
Boise, ID 83720-0010.
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